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A PROCEDURAL FOCUS ON UNLIMITED
SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY
By Henry Hansmann* and Reinier Kraakman**
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent article' we criticized the traditional case for limiting
shareholder liability for corporate torts and developed the case for an
alternative rule of pro rata shareholder liability for tort damages
exceeding a corporation's net worth. We concluded by challenging
the proponents of limited liability to provide further justification for
their position. Two scholars accepted our challenge: Professor Janet
Cooper Alexander, writing in this issue of the Harvard Law Review, 2
and Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, writing in the Yale Law Journal.3
Our original article anticipated that the best case for retaining
limited liability would not rest on a traditional account of its contri-
bution to the efficient functioning of the capital markets. Rather, we
stated that the best arguments for the existing regime would be largely
unrelated to the functional characteristics of the corporate form or the
securities markets. Prominent among these arguments was "a conflict
of law issue: without careful attention to extraterritorial enforcement,
it would not be easy to implement unlimited liability in one jurisdic-
tion while other jurisdictions retained a limited liability rule." 4
Judging from the responses of our critics, our prediction was cor-
rect. Professors Alexander and Grundfest do not seek to resuscitate
the traditional corporate and tort law arguments for unlimited liability.
Rather, both authors base their arguments largely on procedural ob-
stacles to the enforcement of unlimited liability across jurisdictions.
Professor Alexander focuses on the difficulties of inter-jurisdictional
enforcement within the United States, while Professor Grundfest fo-
cuses on the international context.
We welcome the efforts of Professors Alexander and Grundfest to
refine the debate over limited liability by developing a set of issues
* Harris Professor of Law, Yale University.
** Professor of Law, Harvard University. For helpful discussions and comments, we would
particularly like to thank Akhil Amar, Lea Brilmayer, Owen Fiss, Geoffrey Hazard, Jed Rub-
enfeld, and Joseph Singer.
I See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, ioo YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
2 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens,
io6 HARV. L. REv. 387 (1992).
3 See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992).
4 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 1933.
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that, we all agree, are central to the choice of liability regimes. Their
efforts have not convinced us, however, that an unlimited liability
regime is infeasible. We respond here to Professor Alexander's dis-
cussion of procedural issues within the American context. Our de-
tailed response to Professor Grundfest appears elsewhere.
5
II. FEDERAL-LEVEL VERSUS STATE-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION
Our original article devoted only a few brief paragraphs to the
doctrinal problems of choice of law and personal jurisdiction raised
by unlimited shareholder liability.6 It is with these paragraphs that
Professor Alexander's article takes issue.
The brevity of our discussion of these questions did not reflect a
view that procedure is unimportant. Indeed, we devoted substantial
attention to other procedural issues, such as the manner of determining
the date on which liability would attach to shareholders in multi-
plaintiff litigation.7 We did feel, however, that our first task was to
demonstrate the feasibility and wisdom of unlimited liability as mat-
ters of substantive tort and corporate law. Moreover, we believed
that an analysis of the procedural issues raised by unlimited liability
required a clear understanding of the underlying substantive issues.
Our discussion of interstate enforcement in the original article
focused on the situation in which one or more individual states seek
to adopt unlimited liability without the benefit of federal legislation.
This was not because, as Professor Alexander infers,8 we preferred
implementation at the state level. Rather, it was simply to suggest
that experimentation with unlimited liability at the state level need
not await federal legislation.
We quite agree with Professor Alexander that implementing unlim-
ited liability through federal legislation is the preferable course. To-
ward the end of her article, Professor Alexander discusses specific
federal legislation that, she argues, not only passes constitutional mus-
ter, but also meshes nicely with other procedural reforms for the types
of mass tort litigation that are most likely to bankrupt publicly-traded
corporations. At bottom, therefore, Professor Alexander's article
strongly complements our own work by carefully describing a plau-
sible procedural mechanism for implementing unlimited liability.
If Professor Alexander had said no more than this, we would
simply thank her. Much of Professor Alexander's article, however, is
devoted to arguing that without federal legislation it would be infeas-
S See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited
Liability? A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427 (1992).
6 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 1921-23.
7 See id. at 1896-99.
8 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 391-92.
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ible, and indeed unconstitutional, to adopt unlimited shareholder lia-
bility in tort.9 Contrary to our suggestion, then, she asserts that
individual states could not proceed on their own. Because we believe
that Professor Alexander is mistaken about the difficulties of state-
level adoption, further clarification of the issues is in order.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED BY STATE-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION
In our original discussion of conflict of laws and personal jurisdic-
tion, we wrote that "any state should be able to adopt unlimited
shareholder liability for corporate torts, either by legislation or by
judicial decision, for application to any tort claim to which the state's
tort law applies, regardless of the state of incorporation of the cor-
porate defendant." 10 When Professor Alexander quotes this sentence
in the first paragraph of her article" (and elsewhere), she elides the
words "should be able to" and substitutes the paraphrase "could."
The change is subtle, but significant. We meant to make a statement
with a normative cast: that the most coherent and thoughtful inter-
pretation of current doctrine would support our position. Professor
Alexander's paraphrase suggests, instead, that we were making a
positive prediction that well-settled doctrine would compel the courts
of all states to accept a single state's assertion of unlimited liability
for out-of-state shareholders - a stronger statement than we wished
to make.
To focus our debate with Professor Alexander more clearly, two
hypothetical examples may be helpful.
i. Flexxon. In the first example, a widower living in Massachu-
setts invests his entire savings in the stock of Flexxon, a large oil
company incorporated in Delaware. Like many shareholders, he
knows virtually nothing about either corporate law or the locations of
Flexxon's operations and legal domicile. He only knows that Flexxon
is reputed to be a good company. It is his misfortune that Flexxon,
which does no regular business in Illinois, must one day ship oil down
the Mississippi river. The oil spills, and the Illinois courts apply a
novel theory of environmental torts to award actual and punitive
damages of $4o billion against Flexxon, which exceeds the company's
$30 billion net worth. If Flexxon is made to pay it will be bankrupted,
rendering the widower's stock valueless and thus forcing him into
penury.
2. Union Carbicide. In the second example, a Massachusetts
investor with a well-diversified portfolio of $ioo million owns $50,000
9 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 393-431.
10 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 1922.
11 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 393.
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worth of stock in the Union Carbicide Company, a Delaware corpo-
ration that manufactures toxic chemicals. Like most sophisticated
investors, she knows that Union Carbicide maintains its large profits
by minimizing its investments in safety, particularly at its antiquated
plant in Peoria, Illinois. Likewise, she knows that each Union Car-
bicide plant is incorporated as a separate Delaware subsidiary, that
the Peoria subsidiary has only $20 million in net assets, and that the
parent company itself maintains a debt-equity ratio of go% in order
to minimize the amount of assets available to satisfy tort judgments.
Finally, the investor is also aware of recent legal developments in
Illinois and Delaware. Six years ago, the Illinois legislature adopted
an act providing for unlimited pro rata shareholder liability, to be
applied prospectively to all corporate torts committed in Illinois -
regardless of the tortfeasor's legal domicile - five years or more after
the statute's enactment. The act further granted the Illinois courts
personal jurisdiction over out-of-state shareholders to aid its enforce-
ment. In the meantime, however, Delaware revised its corporation
law to provide clearly that shareholders, including parent corpora-
tions, are not liable for a corporation's torts as long as corporate
formalities are observed - something that Union Carbicide and its
subsidiaries have always done.
This year, toxic gases leaked from the Peoria plant, killing 2,000
people outright and cruelly maiming 8,ooo more. The Illinois courts
sustained a conservative total of $io billion in damage awards. Hav-
ing exhausted the subsidiary's $20 million in net assets, the Illinois
plaintiffs now seek to invoke the Illinois shareholder liability act to
satisfy this judgment out of the $5 billion in net assets of the parent
corporation, and also seek to recover the nearly $5 billion in remaining
damages from the parent corporation's shareholders. If the Illinois
plaintiffs are successful, our Massachusetts shareholder will thus lose
not only her $5o,ooo investment, but also pay nearly $50,000 in excess
damages.
Viewed in terms of these two hypothetical examples, we read
Professor Alexander's article as saying the following: (i) Under pre-
vailing doctrine concerning choice of law and jurisdiction, Illinois
plaintiffs, suing in Illinois courts, could collect $3o billion from
Flexxon and bankrupt the widower. (2) On the other hand, the
plaintiffs in the Union Carbicide case would be able to collect only
$20 million against the assets of the Peoria subsidiary. The plaintiffs
would recover nothing from the parent corporation, much less from
the personal assets of its shareholders (including our Massachusetts
investor), because choice of law doctrine would apply Delaware law
on the issue of shareholder liability. Thus, not only would the Mas-
sachusetts investor escape personal liability, but also her $5o,ooo in-
vestment in Union Carbicide stock would retain most of its value as
well. Moreover, this interpretation of choice of law doctrine may well
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be mandated by the Constitution. (3) Even if Illinois law could be
applied to the question of the substantive liability of the parent cor-
poration or its shareholders, the Illinois courts could not constitution-
ally assert personal jurisdiction over the investor with respect to her
$50,000 share of the damages that cannot be paid out of Union
Carbicide's assets.
We disagree that current doctrine compels the conclusions de-
scribed in (2) and (3). We briefly sketch our reasoning here on both
the conflict of laws and the jurisdictional issues involved. 12
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
Professor Alexander argues that the "internal affairs doctrine" re-
quires that shareholder liability for corporate torts be governed by the
law of the state of incorporation rather than by the law of the state
in which the tort occurred. 13 The authority she cites for this propo-
sition is the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.14
The Restatement, however, is far less clear about the issue than
Professor Alexander suggests. The comments to sections 301 and 302
- the sections setting forth the general rule - distinguish between
such clearly internal matters as the adoption of by-laws and methods
of shareholder voting, which are governed by the law of the state of
incorporation, and matters that involve third parties, such as "the
commission of torts."' 5 The Restatement provides that "[t]here is no
reason why corporate acts of the latter sort should not be governed
by the local law of different states."1 6 Section 307, which deals more
12 Many of the practical problems associated with procedural implementation of unlimited
pro rata liability that Professor Alexander raises in Part III of her article are tied to her views
on personal jurisdiction and conflict of laws, and thus do not raise separate issues.
Professor Alexander is probably correct, however, in her assertion that, when litigation
involves multiple plaintiffs, there could be substantial complexity in seeking to satisfy judgments.
See Alexander, supra note 2, at 421-24. But it does not follow that limited liability in tort
should be retained. First, as we noted in our original article, tort litigation that bankrupts
widely-held corporations is likely to remain relatively rare after our proposed reform. Rather,
litigation would in most cases only involve shareholders of closely-held firms and, in particular,
the corporate parents of subsidiaries, see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note x, at 1932, and
the latter types of cases will generally not give rise to the complexities Professor Alexander
discusses. Second, plaintiffs will have a strong incentive to alleviate these complexities by
consolidating either their original tort suits or their collection efforts. Third, complexities could
be substantially avoided by enacting federal legislation of the type that Professor Alexander
describes. Fourth, even if the occasional large case encountered some complexity, it may be a
price well worth paying to remove the highly distortionary incentives created by current limited
liability doctrine.
13 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 410-15.
14 See id. at 410-11 & nn.II7-i9.
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 302 cmt. e (1971)
16 Id.
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specifically with shareholder liability, states only that the law of the
state of incorporation shall determine a shareholder's liability to a
corporation's "creditors for corporate debts."1 7 The brief comments
to section 307 give no examples amplifying on the latter phrase, and
in particular, make no reference to tort liability.
Although the language of section 307 might be read to include tort
claimants, notwithstanding sections 301 and 302, the better wisdom
is to confine its language to voluntary contractual creditors.' 8 For
reasons we discussed in our original article, limited liability makes
eminent sense as the default rule for a corporation's voluntary credi-
tors. Moreover, the law of the state of incorporation is clearly the
law most appropriate to govern the scope of shareholder liability to
contractual creditors: that state's law provides a clear, consistent, and
predictable means for the corporation, its shareholders, and its cred-
itors to determine which assets are being pledged as security for
various obligations, and to adjust the cost of credit accordingly. It is
presumably this logic that lies behind section 307.
But the same reasoning by no means extends to a corporation's
involuntary creditors. As the Union Carbicide hypothetical illustrates,
allowing a state like Delaware to determine the scope of tort liability
for companies incorporated under its law invites gross opportunism
on the part of both the state and the shareholders who invest in its
corporations.
If, for example, Delaware amended its corporation law to limit
corporate liability for tort judgments to the par value of the share-
holder's stock (which most corporations set at zero), we assume that
nobody would seriously argue that the internal affairs doctrine requires
that the new rule be respected. And if Delaware adopted a restrictive
veil-piercing rule that (together with the state's liberal policy toward
the creation of subsidiary corporations) effectively permitted the same
result, it is not obvious that, under a reasonable conflict of laws
doctrine, such a rule deserves any more respect than would the par
value rule.
In support of her interpretation of the Restatement, and of her
assertion that this interpretation may be mandated by the Constitu-
tion, Professor Alexander cites only two cases. Principal among these
is CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.19 But CTS involved
only matters of internal corporate governance (shareholder voting) and
17 Id. § 307.
18 In a footnote, Professor Alexander contests our reading of the "clear language" of the
Restatement. Alexander, supra note 2, at 414 n.129. But we, like the courts, find that language
thoroughly - almost studiedly - ambiguous. Moreover, the Restatement is neither a statute
nor (as we emphasize below) a constitution, but rather just common law doctrine that can be
reinterpreted or simply rejected and replaced by the courts of any state.
19 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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not relations with a corporation's creditors, whether voluntary or
involuntary.
20
On the other hand, there is substantial precedent, not mentioned
by Professor Alexander, that supports our own interpretation of choice
of law doctrine. To begin with, the reporter's note to section 307 of
the Restatement states:
A state may impose liability upon a shareholder of a foreign corpo-
ration for an act done by the corporation in the state, if the state's
relationship to the shareholder is sufficient to make reasonable the
imposition of such liability upon him. See Thomas v. Matthiessen,
232 U.S. 221 (I914); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (IgoI).21
The two Supreme Court cases cited both involve the provision in
California's corporation statute that, until I931, applied a rule of pro
rata unlimited shareholder liability not only to corporate torts, as we
propose, but also to a corporation's contractual debts, and extended
that rule to any foreign corporation doing business in California.
22
The Supreme Court held in both cases (per Justice Holmes in Thomas)
that California could apply its statute even to out-of-state shareholders
of a firm incorporated in another state whose law specifically provided
for limited shareholder liability.
23
More recent precedent follows similar lines. In First National City
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio,24 the Supreme Court refused to
apply the incorporating country's law to determine whether the for-
malities of the corporate form could be invoked to defeat a counter-
20 See id. at 73-75. The other case cited by Professor Alexander, Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Servs., III S. Ct. 1711 (iggi), also concerns matters of internal corporate governance; moreover,
it involves only gap-filling in the interpretation of a federal statute. See id. at I7M5, 1717.
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 307 reporter's note (1971).
22 See Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 233 (19x4); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144,
145-46 (Igoi).
23 In a responding footnote, Professor Alexander seeks to distinguish Pinney and Thomas on
the theory that the shareholders involved could be understood as having accepted the application
of California corporation law to their activities. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 412 n.12i.
But in Thomas, the Court is very clear that "the defendant and his associates . . . intended
their liability to be controlled by the laws of Arizona," where their company was incorporated,
and not by the laws of California. Thomas, 232 U.S. at 233. The preincorporation agreement
that Professor Alexander refers to, like the corporation's charter, specifically provided that the
shareholder would not be personally liable for the corporation's debt. The Court simply stated
that this agreement (and the corporation's charter) would not be given effect because the same
agreement contemplated that the corporation would do business in California. See id. at 234-
35. In short, the Court clearly rejected the shareholder's strong and explicit efforts to avoid
California's unlimited liability statute by incorporating in another state, by appealing to specific
charter provisions, or by relying upon other contractual commitments. In effect, the Court
stated that doing business in California by itself necessarily involved accepting California's
unlimited shareholder liability rule.
24 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
[Vol. io6:446
A PROCEDURAL FOCUS ON UNLIMITED LIABILITY
claim asserted by one of the corporation's debtors. Justice O'Connor,
writing for the Court, stated:
As a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation normally
determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation.
Application of that body of law achieves the need for certainty and
predictability of result while generally protecting the justified expec-
tations of parties with interests in the corporation. See Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302 .... Different conflicts principles
apply, however, where the rights of third parties external to the cor-
poration are at issue. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
supra, § 301. To give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering
state in determining whether the separate juridical status of its instru-
mentality should be respected would permit the state to violate with
impunity the rights of third parties under international law while
effectively insulating itself from liability in foreign courts. 25
Following this logic, other federal courts have also recently rejected
defendants' arguments that the law of the incorporating jurisdiction
must be applied in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.2 6
Because most of these cases involve contract claims, they actually
present a weaker justification for rejecting the incorporating state's
law than do the tort cases that concern us.
We do not wish to claim that the power of one state to regulate
companies incorporated in another state is well settled. It is not. 27
We wish simply to emphasize that not only logic but also established
doctrine provide substantial support for the approach we advocate for
corporate torts.
V. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Professor Alexander asserts that, in a case like our Union Carbicide
hypothetical, it would be an unconstitutional violation of due process
25 Id. at 621-22 (footnote omitted).
26 See Foster v. Berwind Corp., No. 9o-o857, i99i WL 21666, *i (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 199);
Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv., No. 86 Civ. i313 (RCL), 1988 WL
75262, *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1988).
In a responding footnote discussing these two cases, see Alexander, supra note 2, at 412
n.i2i, Professor Alexander seems to confuse the substantive law of veil-piercing (which, in all
the jurisdictions in question in these cases, basically followed the traditional conservative doctrine
rather than the radically different rule that we proposed in our original article) with the
procedural conflict of laws question of whether the incorporating state's law or the forum state's
law should be applied in determining whether the veil ought to be pierced.
27 See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R_ ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESs ENTERPRISES 217 (3d ed. 1983); Jed Rubenfeld, State Takeover Legislation and the
Commerce Clause: The "Foreign" Corporations Problem, 36 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 355, 376-82
(I988). As Professor Rubenfeld notes, the distinction between "internal" and "external" affairs
has remained so vague that courts have been able to classify almost any form of corporate
activity within either category, leaving the internal affairs doctrine a relatively empty formulation
and arguing strongly against any effort to constitutionalize it.
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for Illinois to exert jurisdiction over a Massachusetts shareholder of a
Delaware corporation. 28 We disagree. We believe that such jurisdic-
tion comports well with the "traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice"29 that underlies the constitutional standard of due
process.
A. General Principles
More particularly, following the standards quoted by Professor
Alexander,30 a shareholder in a corporation that has committed a tort
in the forum state can appropriately be said to have "'purposefully
avail[ed] [her]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State,"' 31 or "'purposefully directed' [her] activities at residents
of the forum."32 The very object of stock ownership is to avail oneself
of the privilege of conducting business in all the jurisdictions in which
the corporation is active. And surely, our "traditional conception of
fair play and substantial justice" is not offended by requiring a share-
holder who participates pro rata in the profits of a business, without
upper bound, also to bear all of its costs, pro rata and without upper
bound, rather than forcing some of these costs onto involuntary third
parties such as tort victims.
It is presumably under an implicit notion of "purposefully availing"
that current law would allow Illinois, in our Flexxon hypothetical, to
assert jurisdiction sufficient to appropriate all of the widower's wealth
as tort damages, even though neither the widower's place of residence,
nor Flexxon's place of incorporation, nor Flexxon's corporate assets,
are located in Illinois. Indeed, everyone, including Professor Alex-
ander, evidently agrees that the widower who invests his life savings
in Flexxon effectively subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the Illinois
courts to the full extent of his investment. 33 Our proposed rule of
pro rata shareholder liability merely alters this convention so that
shareholders, upon investing in a corporation, are put on notice that
they risk substantive liability not just up to the amount they invest,
but rather, up to their pro rata share of all tort damages assessed
28 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 394-404.
29 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (x945).
30 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 395.
31 World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (198o) (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
32 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (x985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
33 In a responding footnote, see Alexander, supra note 2, at 398 n.54, Professor Alexander
seems to miss the point of our Flexxon hypothetical, which was precisely to emphasize how
arbitrary it is, for the purposes of procedure, to attribute too much metaphysical force to the
concept of the corporation as a "separate legal entity."
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against the corporation. Assuming that shareholders receive adequate
notice of the new rule, there seems no reason why Illinois courts
should not be able to assert jurisdiction sufficient to collect the full
damages for which shareholders are liable under the substantive law.
The issue of notice here is, of course, important. Any effort to
impose unlimited liability retroactively should give us pause as a
matter of due process. But when, as we proposed in our original
Article,3 4 a tort rule of unlimited liability is well publicized and ap-
plied only prospectively, every investor will know that a purchase of
stock puts her personal assets at risk. The investor who wishes to
avoid serious risk of personal liability can do so by confining her
investments to (a) non-equity assets such as bonds and savings depos-
its; (b) companies that are adequately capitalized or insured; or (c)
highly diversified mutual funds. As an alternative, she can purchase
portfolio insurance.
Professor Alexander emphasizes direct control as a basis for juris-
diction, and asserts that "[a] passive shareholder of a public corpora-
tion . .. lacks the control over the actions of an in-state actor (the
corporation) that characterizes the principal-agent, veil-piercing, and
partnership examples. '35 Consequently, she argues, jurisdiction that
can be asserted in the latter cases does not extend to the former. But
a major point of our article is precisely that a narrow notion of direct
control is inappropriate to an analysis of corporate torts, as it is to
analyzing corporate policies in general. Under unlimited liability,
small investors (indeed, all investors) who cannot control a corpora-
tion's affairs directly will decline to invest in the stocks of companies
that do not adequately compensate investors for the liability risks that
they impose. The resulting decline in stock prices will pressure man-
agement to change its policies, lest the stock be purchased by some-
body who can assemble sufficient shares to oust the management and
change the corporation's policies. In short, all shareholders participate
importantly in corporate control through the market.
A further consideration supporting Illinois's assertion of jurisdic-
tion - one that is critical from the perspective of due process - is
that shareholders do not need to assume the burden of appearing in
court in the forum state "to defend the suit away from [their] home."36
All questions of both corporate and shareholder liability should be
settled in the initial tort suit against the corporation that is brought
in the forum state.37 In this suit, the corporation should act as the
34 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 1923.
3s Alexander, supra note 2, at 401.
36 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
37 Indeed, individual shareholders should not be permitted to raise individual defenses to the
substantive tort suit. Rather, the only issue that should be open for them to contest is whether
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exclusive representative of the shareholders, just as it now does in
tort actions brought under limited liability regimes (as in the Flexxon
hypothetical).
Finally, the state in which a tort occurs - Illinois in our hypo-
thetical - has an obvious interest in adjudicating all aspects of the
tort suit, including the liability of individual shareholders. This in-
terest is surely as strong, and arguably more legitimate, than that of
either the shareholder's state of residence or the corporation's legal
domicile. For this reason, permitting Illinois to exercise jurisdiction
furthers rather than frustrates, the sovereignty concerns that Professor
Alexander emphasizes. 38 Indeed, denying jurisdiction would shift sov-
ereignty over Illinois's industrial activity to states - Massachusetts or
Delaware - whose principal interest is to externalize costs onto Illi-
nois residents.
B. Is There Contrary Precedent?
Professor Alexander discusses three principal cases in which, she
claims, "the Supreme Court has rejected the jurisdictional premises of
Professors Hansmann's and Kraakman's state tort law approach."3 9
We disagree with her interpretation of each of these cases.
The first of these cases is Shaffer v. Heitner,40 which Professor
Alexander characterizes as holding that "mere ownership of shares
does not satisfy the minimum contacts test, even when the corporation
is incorporated in the state. '41 We read that case much differently.
Shaffer involved a statute that purported to give Delaware courts
quasi in rem jurisdiction over any nonresident who owned property
in Delaware regardless of whether this property was related to the
cause of action at issue. The defendants in Shaffer owned stock in a
Delaware corporation. The Delaware courts had characterized this
stock as in-state property, thus giving them jurisdiction over the de-
fendants under the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
simply that the presence of property in a state, without more, does
not suffice to give the state personal jurisdiction over the property
owner "where the property . is completely unrelated to the plain-
they were shareholders at the time relevant for determining liability. See Hansmann & Kraak-
man, supra note i, at igoo.
On the other hand, it should presumably be open to shareholders, in appropriate cases, to
contest whether the corporation is acting as an adequate representative of the shareholders'
interests as a class.
38 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 402-03.
39 Id. at 403.
40 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
41 Alexander, supra note 2, at 396.
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tiff's cause of action.' 42 The Court specifically noted that "[t]he pres-
ence of property may . . . favor jurisdiction in cases [in which] the
cause of action is . . related to rights and duties growing out of that
ownership." 43 Thus, Shaffer is fully consistent with basing jurisdiction
on stock ownership when, as under our proposed pro rata liability
rule, stock ownership is the very predicate of substantive tort liability,
and the amount of stock owned determines the damages for which
the defendant is liable. 44
In support of her reading of Shaffer, Professor Alexander also cites
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 45 in which the Supreme Court
rejected, in a brief footnote, the proposition that jurisdiction over a
corporation automatically establishes jurisdiction over that corpora-
tion's holding company.46 We did not argue, however, that jurisdic-
tion over a corporation always implies jurisdiction over that corpo-
ration's shareholders, or even over a parent corporation. In many
situations, such jurisdiction would arguably be incorrect. This may
be true when, for example, important defenses are available to the
shareholder that are not available to the corporation, so that it is
appropriate for the shareholder to have independent representation.
Finally, Professor Alexander invokes World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,47 in which the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma
could not obtain jurisdiction over a New York Volkswagen dealer or
that dealer's wholesale distributor, also located in New York, in a tort
suit seeking damages for an accident in Oklahoma involving an au-
tomobile purchased from the New York dealer and subsequently dri-
ven to Oklahoma.48 Professor Alexander argues that jurisdiction to
assess pro rata personal liability against corporate shareholders would
be even more difficult to justify, and thus falls outside constitutional
limits. 4 9
42 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208-09 (emphasis added).
43 Id. at 208.
44 In a responding footnote, see Alexander, supra note 2, at 399 n.58, Professor Alexander
misreads our argument concerning Shaffer. We are not claiming that Illinois should have
jurisdiction over the shareholder in Union Carbicide based on a theory that she owns "property"
in the form of a stock certificate, much less are we concerned with arguments about the state
in which those certificates are deemed to reside. Indeed, the central point of the Court's opinion
in Shaffer, as we read it, is precisely to reject such formalistic notions of quasi in rem jurisdiction
in favor of a general functional approach to jurisdiction. The Illinois courts should have
jurisdiction over the Union Carbicide shareholder because she is an owner of a company that
committed a tort in Illinois. Or, if we are to speak in terms of property, the relevant piece of
property that she owns is the chemical plant in Peoria, Illinois that caused the tort. Her shares
of Union Carbicide stock are simply the tokens of that ownership.
45 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
46 See id. at 781 n.13. Because the First Circuit did not inquire into the propriety of
jurisdiction over the parent firm, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. See id.
47 444 U.S. 286 (i98o).
48 See id. at 295.
49 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 397-98.
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But important differences exist between World-Wide Volkswagen
and our proposal for unlimited liability, each of which is illustrated
by our Union Carbicide example. First, in strong contrast to the
dealer and distributor in World-Wide Volkswagen, the shareholders in
Union Carbicide need not bear the burden of hiring counsel and
appearing personally to defend themselves in the courts of a distant
state. Rather, they have a representative, the corporation, that is
perfectly situated to defend them in the tort suit and that must, in
fact, defend the suit in any event. Second, the relationship between
Union Carbicide's shareholders and the corporation's tortious activity
is far closer than that between the dealer and distributor in World-
Wide Volkswagen and the accident caused by the auto they had sold.
The shareholders, after all, own the plant that caused the tort. If the
New York dealer had owned and operated the car that caused the
accident in Oklahoma, World-Wide Volkswagen would have been a
very different case. Third, the plaintiffs in World-Wide Volkswagen
were not residents of Oklahoma, but rather of New York - the state
in which the defendants resided and in which the purchase that
formed the basis of the alleged liability took place. The plaintiffs
simply happened to be driving through Oklahoma when the accident
involved occurred. By contrast, because the plaintiffs in our Union
Carbicide hypothetical are residents of the forum state, the state's
legitimate interest in adjudicating the dispute is enhanced. Moreover,
it would be burdensome for the plaintiffs to litigate elsewhere.i 0 For
all of these reasons, World-Wide Volkswagen appears to be even less
apposite to jurisdiction under a pro rata liability statute than are
Shaffer and Keeton.
VI. CoNcLUSION
Professor Alexander warns us against framing a reform of sub-
stantive law without attending to the procedures needed to implement
it. But the reverse is equally important: procedural rules should not
be viewed in isolaticn from the underlying substantive law. Moreover,
the relevance of substance to procedure is nowhere clearer than in the
50 Although the Court did not address this third point in its opinion in World-Wide Volks-
wagen, it did emphasize the issue in a subsequent case with very similar facts. See Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987).
In a responding footnote, Professor Alexander emphasizes that "[t]he tort, however, occurred
in Oklahoma." Alexander, supra note 2, at 398 n.54. But another way of stating the point we
are making here is that one could well argue instead that the tort occurred in New York when
the defendants sold the plaintiffs a defective car.
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case of shareholder liability for corporate torts, in which the proce-
dural issues closely trace the substantive issues. Essentially the same
arguments that support unlimited shareholder liability as a matter of
substantive policy also support the conflict of laws and jurisdictional
doctrines that are necessary and appropriate to enforce that liability.
